Them and Us by Braveman, Daan
\\server05\productn\O\ORE\82-1\ORE103.txt unknown Seq: 1 11-NOV-03 9:13
DAAN BRAVEMAN*
Tribal Sovereignty:  Them and Us
A central theme in federal Indian law focuses on the inher-ent sovereign power of tribes to regulate the activities of
non-tribal members who enter Indian country.1  Chief Justice
Marshall addressed this issue 170 years ago in Worcester v. Geor-
gia ,2 one of the foundational cases3 in federal Indian law.
Worcester  did not end the matter, and tribal sovereignty issues
have persisted over the past two centuries.  These sovereignty
claims have assumed contemporary importance as tribes increas-
ingly engage in various forms of economic development.  The
current economic activities create additional opportunities for in-
teraction between tribes and non-tribal members,4 thereby ex-
panding the potential for disputes that test the limits of tribal
sovereign authority.
For the past three decades, Congress and the Bureau of Indian
Affairs have recognized the importance of sovereignty in pro-
moting tribal economic development and self-sufficiency.5  Al-
* Professor of Law, Syracuse University College of Law.  I want to thank Leslie
Bender and Robert Porter for their especially thoughtful comments.  I also owe
thanks to my research assistant, Carrie Colegrove, for her diligent work.
1 “Indian country” is defined as:
(a) all land within the limits of any Indian reservation under the jurisdic-
tion of the United States Government, notwithstanding the issuance of any
patent, and, including rights-of-way running through the reservation, (b) all
dependent Indian communities within the borders of the United States
whether within the original or subsequently acquired territory thereof, and
whether within or without the limits of a state, and (c) all Indian allot-
ments, the Indian titles to which have not been extinguished, including
rights-of-way running through the same.
18 U.S.C. § 1151 (1994).  Although § 1151 is concerned with criminal jurisdiction, it
has been applied by the Court to questions of civil jurisdiction. See  DeCoteau v.
Dist. County Court, 420 U.S. 425, 427 n.2 (1975).
2 Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
3 See id. ; Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831); Johnson v. McIn-
tosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823).  These three cases are often referred to as the
“Marshall trilogy.”
4 See infra  text accompanying notes 264-82.
5 See, e.g. , Indian Tribal Economic Development and Contract Encouragement
[75]
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though the legislative and executive branches have taken steps to
enhance tribal sovereign powers, the Supreme Court has moved
in precisely the opposite direction.  In a series of cases, culminat-
ing most recently in Nevada v. Hicks ,6 the Court has severely
curtailed tribal authority over nonmembers.  Part I of this Article
traces the Court’s treatment of issues related to inherent tribal
sovereignty over nonmembers, describing the doctrinal shift that
has occurred in the time between Worcester  and Hicks .7  This
Article intentionally focuses on the judicial, rather than the legis-
lative or executive, understandings of inherent sovereignty be-
Act of 2000, 25 U.S.C.A. § 81 (2001); Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, 18 U.S.C.
§§ 1166-1168 (1994), 25 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2721 (1994); Indian Financing Act of 1974,
25 U.S.C. §§ 1451-1453, 1461-1469, 1481-1497, 1497a, 1498, 1499, 1511, 1512, 1521-
1524, 1541-1544 (1994); Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act,
25 U.S.C.A. §§ 13a, 450, 450a-450c-1, 450f, 450h-450j, 450j-1, 450k-450m, 450m-1,
450n, 455-58, 458a-458c, 458aa-458hh, 458aaa, 458aaa-1-458aaa-18, 458bbb, 458bbb-
1, 458bbb-2 (2001); 42 U.S.C. § 20046 (1994).  In Oklahoma Tax Commission v. Citi-
zen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe , 498 U.S. 505 (1991), the Court commented on
“Congress’ desire to promote the ‘goal of Indian self-government, including its
“overriding goal” of encouraging tribal self-sufficiency and economic develop-
ment.’” Id.  at 510 (quoting California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S.
202, 216 (1987)).
6 Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353 (2001).
7 Others have documented the Court’s retreat from Worcester , and it is not my
purpose to repeat that discussion. See , e.g. , FRANK POMMERSHEIM, BRAID OF
FEATHERS (1995); DAVID E. WILKINS, AMERICAN INDIAN SOVEREIGNTY AND THE
U.S. SUPREME COURT:  THE MASKING OF JUSTICE (1997); Philip S. Deloria & Nell
Jessup Newton, The Criminal Jurisdiction of Tribal Courts over Non-Member Indi-
ans:  An Examination of the Basic Framework of Inherent Tribal Sovereignty Before
and After  Duro v. Reina, 38 FED. B. NEWS & J. 70 (1991); Philip P. Frickey, Adjudi-
cation and Its Discontents:  Coherence and Conciliation in Federal Indian Law,  110
HARV. L. REV. 1754 (1997); Philip P. Frickey, A Common Law for Our Age of
Colonialism:  The Judicial Divestiture of Indian Tribal Authority Over Nonmembers ,
109 YALE L.J. 1 (1999) [hereinafter Frickey, Common Law]; Philip P. Frickey, Mar-
shalling Past and Present:  Colonialism, Constitutionalism, and Interpretation in Fed-
eral Indian Law , 107 HARV. L. REV. 381 (1993) [hereinafter Frickey, Marshalling
Past and Present]; David H. Getches, Beyond Indian Law:  The Rehnquist Court’s
Pursuit of States’ Rights, Color-Blind Justice and Mainstream Values , 86 MINN. L.
REV. 267 (2001) [hereinafter Getches, Beyond Indian Law]; David H. Getches, Con-
quering the Cultural Frontier:  The New Subjectivism of the Supreme Court in Indian
Law , 84 CAL. L. REV. 1573 (1996) [hereinafter Getches, Conquering the Cultural
Frontier]; L. Scott Gould, The Consent Paradigm:  Tribal Sovereignty at the Millen-
nium , 96 COLUM. L. REV. 809 (1996); Sarah Krakoff, Undoing Indian Law One Case
at a Time:  Judicial Minimalism and Tribal Sovereignty , 50 AM. U. L. REV. 1177
(2001); Robert Laurence, The Dominant Society’s Judicial Reluctance to Allow Tri-
bal Civil Law to Apply to Non-Indians:  Reservation Diminishment, Modern Demog-
raphy and the Indian Civil Rights Act , 30 U. RICH. L. REV. 781 (1996); Judith V.
Royster, The Legacy of Allotment , 27 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1 (1995); Robert A. Williams,
Jr., The Algebra of Federal Indian Law:  The Hard Trail of Decolonizing and Ameri-
canizing the White Man’s Indian Jurisprudence , 1986 WIS. L. REV. 219 (1986).
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cause the recent restrictions are the product of the Court’s
activism.8
While the shift from Worcester  to Hicks  is significant, Part II
argues that a common theme is found in the earlier and modern
cases.  Underlying the Court’s approach to inherent tribal sover-
eignty since Worcester  and to the present is an implicit under-
standing of Indian peoples as the “other,”9 as “them” rather than
“us.” The use of the them/us construction leads the current Court
to its conclusion that inherent tribal sovereignty should be lim-
ited to instances when Indian peoples are behaving in a distinc-
tive fashion and only to the extent of governing themselves.
In this respect, the Court’s modern approach calls to mind an
incident that occurred while President Ronald Reagan was trav-
eling in Moscow in 1988.  A student asked President Reagan how
the United States justifies its Indian policy.  “‘Maybe we made a
mistake,’ Reagan answered, in trying to maintain Indian cultures.
Maybe we should not have humored them  in wanting to stay in
that kind of primitive life-style.  Maybe we should have said, ‘No,
come join us .  Be citizens along with the rest of us .’”10
As Barbara Atwood noted, “debates about tribal sovereignty
quickly become debates about Indian identity.”11  The Court’s
tribal sovereignty jurisprudence illustrates this proposition, rely-
ing on implicit views of Indian identity to resolve disputes over
tribal adjudicative and regulatory power.12  The cases treat tribal
sovereignty issues against a backdrop that uses a Reagan-type
portrayal of Indians as either them  or us .  As Rennard Strickland
observed in another context, however, Indians “are not behaving
8 Robert Williams has described more generally the discourses used by federal
judges, the executive branch, members of Congress, and white society to constrain
tribalism.  All of these, he concluded, “share in their unquestioned reliance on law
and legal discourse as the principal tool for mediating and controlling tribalism’s
perceived difference from the values of the dominant society.”  Robert A. Williams,
Jr., Documents of Barbarism:  The Contemporary Legacy of European Racism and
Colonialism in the Narrative Traditions of Federal Indian Law,  31 ARIZ. L. REV. 237,
262 (1989).
9 See  Judith Resnick, Dependent Sovereigns:  Indian Tribes, States, and the Federal
Courts , 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 671, 732-33 (1989) (noting the Court’s treatment of In-
dian tribes as the “other”).
10 NATIVE AMERICAN TESTIMONY: A CHRONICLE OF INDIAN-WHITE RELATIONS
FROM PROPHECY TO THE PRESENT, 1492-1992 405 (Peter Nabokov ed., 1991) (em-
phasis added).
11 Barbara Ann Atwood, Identity and Assimilation:  Changing Definitions of Tri-
bal Power over Children , 83 MINN. L. REV. 927, 937 (1999).
12 See infra  Part II.
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in the forms that white society has historically defined as the ap-
propriate Indian form.”13  However, many tribes are acting like
dominant groups by engaging in a variety of economic develop-
ment activities.14  In such circumstances, tribal sovereignty is crit-
ical even though Indian peoples are not performing in some
preconceived, different manner.
The conclusion explains that by relying on a them/us under-
standing of Indians to resolve sovereignty disputes, the Court ig-
nores the possibility that Indian peoples might choose to be both:
they might choose to behave like dominant groups, but at the
same time desire to maintain their distinctiveness.  Indeed, one
of the central challenges for Indian peoples is to engage in activi-
ties that will promote self-sufficiency while also maintaining their
separate political and cultural identities.  As Pulitzer Prize win-
ner N. Scott Momaday observed, “The major issues we now face
are survival—how to live in the modern world.  Part of that is
how to remain Indian, how to assimilate without ceasing to be an
Indian.”15  Tribal sovereignty16 is an essential component of that
survival, enabling Indian peoples to live in the modern world
while at the same time maintaining their distinct identities.
I
THE EROSION OF TRIBAL SOVEREIGNTY
The current disputes over tribal sovereignty have their histori-
cal roots in Worcester v. Georgia ,17 which led to one of the most
serious constitutional crises in our nation’s history.18  The clash
arose out of governmental attempts to force the eastern Indian
tribes to move west.  Soon after his election in 1828, President
Andrew Jackson decided “it was farcical to treat the Indian tribes
13 RENNARD STRICKLAND, TONTO’S REVENGE 105 (1997).
14 See infra  text accompanying notes 264-76.
15 NATIVE AMERICAN TESTIMONY, supra  note 10, at 438.
16 The legal disputes discussed in this article focus on political sovereignty over
territory as well as people.  Wallace Coffey and Rebecca Tsosie have argued that
Indian peoples should construct a doctrine of cultural sovereignty as well. See gener-
ally  Wallace Coffey & Rebecca Tsosie, Rethinking the Tribal Sovereignty Doctrine:
Culture Sovereignty and the Collective Future of Indian Nations , 12 STAN. L. &
POL’Y REV. 191 (2001).
17 Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832). See generally  Symposium,
Cultural Sovereignty:  Native Rights in the 21st Century , 34 ARIZ. ST. L. J. 1 (2002).
18 See  1 CHARLES WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY
753-54 (rev. ed., Fred B. Rothman & Co. 1987) (1922).
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as though they were sovereign and independent nations . . . .”19
He opposed allowing the tribes to continue to exist as separate
enclaves within the states and engaged in efforts to remove the
Indians to west of the Mississippi.20  Among other things, he rec-
ommended that the states exercise jurisdiction over Indians who
did not move voluntarily.21  Georgia responded with various laws
designed to extend state laws to Cherokee territory, take the
Cherokee Nation lands, and abolish its government.22
The Cherokee Indian Nation attempted to enjoin the enforce-
ment of these laws by initiating a lawsuit against the State of
Georgia in the Supreme Court.23  The Nation alleged that execu-
tion of the Georgia laws would “annihilate the Cherokees as a
political society, and . . . seize, for use of Georgia, the lands of the
nation which have been assured to them by the United States in
solemn treaties repeatedly made and still in force.”24  The Chero-
kee Nation maintained that the Court had original jurisdiction
under Article III of the Constitution25 to entertain its claim be-
cause the suit was between a state and a foreign state.
Georgia officials elected to ignore the proceedings and did not
appear to defend the lawsuit.26  Nevertheless, the Court dis-
missed the suit, holding in Cherokee Nation v. Georgia27 that an
Indian tribe is not a foreign state within the meaning of Article
III and that the Court, therefore, lacked original jurisdiction.28
While no opinion had enough votes to constitute a majority of
the Court, scholars often cite Chief Justice Marshall’s opinion for
its important dictum.29  At the outset, Marshall noted that a ma-
jority of the justices agreed that the Cherokee Nation was a dis-
tinct political entity.  He said, “So much of the [Cherokee
Nation’s] argument as was intended to prove the character of the
19 FRANCIS PAUL PRUCHA, AMERICAN INDIAN POLICY IN THE FORMATIVE
YEARS:  THE INDIAN TRADE & INTERCOURSE ACTS, 1790-1834 233 (2d ed. 1970).
20 Id.  at 235.  The Indian Removal Act of 1830, ch. 148, 4 Stat. 41l, authorized the
President to trade western lands for eastern tribal lands. See FELIX S. COHEN, FE-
LIX S. COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 81 (Rennard Strickland et al.
eds., Michie Bobbs-Merrill 1982) (1942).
21 COHEN, supra  note 20, at 81.
22 Id.
23 See  Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831).
24 Id.  at 15.
25 See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
26 See  30 U.S. (5 Pet.) at 14.
27 Id.  at 20.
28 Id.
29 See, e.g. , COHEN, supra  note 20, at 82.
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Cherokees as a state, a distinct political society, separated from
others, capable of managing its own affairs and governing itself,
has, in the opinion of a majority of the judges, been completely
successful.”30  He concluded, however, that because of the rela-
tion between the Indians and the United States, an Indian tribe
cannot be a “foreign” state.31  Specifically, he noted that all In-
dian territory is geographically within the United States and trea-
ties acknowledge that the tribes are under the protection of the
United States.32  Moreover, the Constitution provides in the
Commerce Clause that Congress has power to “regulate Com-
merce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and
with the Indian Tribes.”33  Marshall noted that in this clause,
tribes are clearly distinguished from foreign nations as well as
states.34  In dictum that later became the basis for one of the
foundational principles of federal Indian law, Marshall character-
ized Indian tribes as “domestic dependent nations.”35
One year later, in 1832, the Court had the opportunity to con-
front the merits of the issue it avoided in Cherokee Nation .  As
part of its effort to harass and remove the Cherokees, Georgia
enacted a law that provided for punishment of all white persons
who resided within the limits of the Cherokee nation without ob-
taining a license from the governor or his agent.36  Samuel
Worcester and other missionaries were convicted under this law
and sentenced to imprisonment for four years.37  They appealed
to the Supreme Court, arguing that Georgia had no authority to
regulate conduct on the tribe’s land and that the state law was
unconstitutional.  In contrast to Cherokee Nation , there was no
jurisdictional bar to the missionaries’ challenge.  Thus, Marshall
was able to reach the merits of the underlying claim regarding
30 Cherokee Nation , 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) at 16.
31 Id.  at 17.
32 Id.
33 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
34 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) at 18.
35 Id.  at 17.  The principle that the federal government has plenary power over
Indian affairs is well established but much criticized. See, e.g. , Frickey, Marshalling
Past and Present , supra  note 7; Robert B. Porter, The Meaning of Indigenous Nation
Sovereignty , 34 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 75 (2002); WILKINS, supra  note 7; Williams, supra
note 7.  Recently, Robert Clinton challenged the underlying assumptions of the ple-
nary power doctrine, concluding that it lacks constitutional support and cannot be
reconciled with constitutional theory.  Robert Clinton, There is No Federal
Supremacy Clause for Indian Tribes,  34 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 113 (2002).
36 See  Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 542 (1832).
37 Id.  at 536-37.
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the relationship between the states and Indian tribes.  Writing for
a majority of the Court in Worcester , he stated:
The Cherokee nation . . . is a distinct community occupying its
own territory, with boundaries accurately described, in which
the laws of Georgia can have no force, and which the citizens
of Georgia have no right to enter, but with the assent of the
Cherokees themselves, or in conformity with treaties, and with
the acts of Congress.38
He added, “The treaties and laws of the United States contem-
plate the Indian territory as completely separated from that of
the states; and provide that all intercourse with them shall be
carried on exclusively by the government of the Union.”39
In concluding that Georgia’s power does not extend to Indian
territory within state borders, the Court relied on a variety of
sources.  First, it stated that the Constitution confers on Con-
gress, rather than the states, the power to make war and peace,40
to regulate commerce with the Indian tribes,41 and to enter into
treaties.42  Second, the Court relied on the Treaty of Hopewell
negotiated in 1791 between the United States and the Cherokee
Nation.43  That treaty acknowledged that the Cherokee Nation is
under the protection of the United States and no other power, a
provision found in Indian treaties generally.44  Third, the Court
pointed to a number of federal laws that “manifestly consider the
several Indian nations as distinct political communities . . . .”45
Finally, throughout the opinion,46 Marshall referred to the Indian
tribes’ inherent right of self-government, which was part of the
“actual state of things”47 before the Revolutionary War and
which was recognized by the Treaty of Hopewell and by congres-
sional acts.48
The Supreme Court reversed the state court judgment and is-
sued an order directing the state superior court to release
38 Id.  at 561.
39 Id.  at 557.
40 Id.  at 559.  It is important to recall that relations with the Indian tribes often
were considered a matter of war and peace. See  Oneida Indian Nation v. New York,
860 F.2d 1145 (2d Cir. 1988).
41 Worcester , 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 559.
42 Id.
43 Id.  at 554-55.
44 See id.  at 551.
45 Id.  at 557.
46 See id.  at 536-97.
47 Id.  at 543.
48 Id.  at 556.
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Worcester and the other prisoners.49  Georgia officials (who
again did not appear to argue the case before the Court) refused
to comply with the mandate, announcing that they would not ac-
cept the determination that Georgia lacked jurisdiction over the
tribe.50  There was widespread fear that President Jackson would
not take steps to enforce the Supreme Court’s judgment.51  In-
deed, President Jackson reportedly made the following infamous
statement about the Worcester  decision:  “Well, John Marshall
has made his decision, now let him enforce it.”52  A direct consti-
tutional clash was avoided, however, when in 1833 the Governor
of Georgia pardoned the missionaries.53
For purposes here, the importance of the Cherokee cases is
twofold.  First, Worcester  recognized that Indian tribes had inher-
ent powers of self-government that predated the Constitution
and continued to exist after its ratification.  The Court observed
that the “settled state of things when the war of our revolution
commenced”54 was that tribes were considered as “nations capa-
ble of . . . governing themselves . . . .”55 Worcester , thus, provided
the foundation for “the most basic principle of all Indian law,”56
that the “powers of Indian tribes are, in general, ‘inherent powers
of a limited sovereignty which has never been extinguished. ’”57
The Court later stated that Indian tribes are much more than vol-
untary organizations; they “are unique aggregations possessing
attributes of sovereignty over both their members and their
territory . . . .”58
Second, Worcester  established that as “distinct, independent
political communities,”59 Indian tribes are not subject to state
49 Id.  at 561-63.
50 COHEN, supra  note 20, at 83.
51 WARREN, supra  note 18, at 757-59.
52 Charles Warren has written that it is a “matter of extreme doubt” whether Jack-
son actually made this statement. Id.  at 759.
53 See  COHEN, supra  note 20, at 83.  The pardon did not diminish Georgia’s ef-
forts to remove the Cherokees, who were forced to move west on what is known as
the “Trail of Tears.” Id.  at 92.  The forced removal of the Cherokees was part of a
much larger effort to remove eastern tribes. Id.
54 Worcester , 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 549.
55 Id.  at 548.
56 COHEN, supra  note 20, at 231.
57 United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 322-23 (1978) (quoting FELIX S. CO-
HEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 122 (Gov’t Printing Office 1945)
(1942)).
58 United States v. Mazurie, 409 U.S. 544, 557 (1975). See also  Talton v. Mayes,
163 U.S. 376 (1896).
59 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 559.
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regulation.  It is noteworthy that the Court reached that result in
a case in which the state was attempting to regulate non-Indians
entering onto Indian country.  To be sure, the earlier Cherokee
Nation  decision determined that tribes do not have the sovereign
status of foreign nations and have relinquished some aspects of
their sovereignty.  The two Cherokee Nation cases together,
however, made clear that any relinquishment of tribal sover-
eignty is a matter for the federal government, not the individual
states.  As “domestic dependent nations,” tribes may be forced to
surrender some of their sovereignty to the United States but they
did not cede any of their independence to the states.
The Cherokee cases served as the foundation for federal In-
dian law.  The Court frequently relied on these cases in affirming
the dual principles that Indian tribes retain inherent sovereignty
and that this sovereignty is not subject to restriction by state gov-
ernments.60  The 1978 decision of United States v. Wheeler61 is a
more recent illustration of the Court’s recognition of the inher-
ent sovereignty of Indian tribes.  The defendant in Wheeler  was
an Indian who had pled guilty to disorderly conduct in the Nav-
ajo Tribal Court.62  The United States subsequently indicted him
for rape arising out of the same incident and attempted to prose-
cute him in federal court under the Major Crimes Act.63  The
issue before the Court was whether the Double Jeopardy Clause
of the Fifth Amendment barred the federal prosecution.64  The
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that Indian tribes derive
their power to punish from the federal government, which has
plenary power over the tribes.65  As a result, the Court of Ap-
peals held that the dual sovereignty concept66 did not apply and
that the Double Jeopardy Clause precluded the federal prosecu-
60 Worcester  is among the most often cited Supreme Court decisions.  It is re-
ported that of the pre-Civil War Supreme Court opinions, only three (Marbury v.
Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803), McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.)
316 (1819), and United States v. Perez, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 579 (1824)) have been
cited more during the 1970s and 1980s. DAVID GETCHES ET AL., CASES AND
MATERIALS ON FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 125 (4th ed. 1998).
61 United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313 (1978).
62 Id.  at 314-15.
63 See  18 U.S.C. § 1153 (1994).
64 Wheeler , 435 U.S. 313, 316.
65 United States v. Wheeler, 545 F.2d 1255, 1257 (9th Cir. 1976).
66 The dual sovereignty concept provides that successive prosecutions under the
laws of separate sovereigns do not subject the defendant to double jeopardy. See
Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121, 137 (1959).
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tion.67  In reversing, the Supreme Court determined that the
lower court should have applied the dual sovereignty concept
and, thus, the Double Jeopardy Clause did not bar the federal
prosecution for rape.68  The Court observed that the power to
punish offenses committed by tribal members, “which was part of
the Navajos’ primeval sovereignty, has never been taken away
from them, either explicitly or implicitly . . . . It follows that when
the Navajo Tribe exercises this power, it does so as part of its
retained sovereignty and not as an arm of the Federal Govern-
ment.”69  The Court further explained that “until Congress acts,
the tribes retain their existing sovereign powers.  In sum, Indian
tribes still possess those aspects of sovereignty not withdrawn by
treaty or statute, or by implication as a necessary result of their
dependent status.”70
The Court also relied on the Cherokee Nation cases in resolv-
ing a dispute over jurisdiction to entertain a claim by a non-In-
dian against a Navajo Indian who lived on the Navajo
Reservation.  In Williams v. Lee ,71 the non-Indian plaintiff, who
operated a general store on the Reservation, sued the Indian de-
fendant and his wife in state court to collect for goods sold on
credit.72  The defendants moved to dismiss the state court action
on the ground that only the tribal court had power to hear the
case.73  The Arizona Supreme Court concluded that the state
court had jurisdiction, ruling that state courts can exercise juris-
diction in civil suits by a non-Indian against an Indian unless fed-
eral law directs otherwise.74  The Supreme Court reversed,
holding that the Navajo Tribal court has jurisdiction exclusive of
the state courts.75  In so doing, it recognized that over the years
the principles of the Cherokee cases had been modified where
essential tribal relations were not involved and the rights of Indi-
ans were not jeopardized.76  Justice Black’s opinion for a unani-
mous Court, however, stressed that the “basic policy of
67 Wheeler , 545 U.S. at 1258.
68 Wheeler , 435 U.S. at 332.
69 Id.  at 328.
70 Id.  at 323.
71 Williams v. Lee , 358 U.S. 217 (1959).
72 Id.  at 217-18.
73 Id.  at 218.
74 Id.
75 Id.  at 223.
76 Id.  at 219.
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Worcester  has remained.”77  He specifically noted that the Court
reached its determination despite the fact that plaintiff was not
an Indian:  “He was on the Reservation and the transaction with
an Indian took place there.  The cases in this Court have consist-
ently guarded the authority of Indian governments over their res-
ervations.”78  Moreover, Justice Black noted in Williams  that
Congress and the Court have consistently assumed that the states
have no power to regulate the affairs of Indians on the reserva-
tion.79  The Court, thus, rejected the Arizona court’s presump-
tion that state courts have power in such circumstances unless
divested by Congress.  Instead, it adopted the “infringement test”
to determine whether a state has the power to regulate affairs on
a reservation.80  Absent congressional acts, a court must deter-
mine whether state action would infringe on the right of reserva-
tion Indians to self-government.81  At another point in the
opinion, the Court even suggested that if there is any presump-
tion it would be against state court jurisdiction unless Congress
expressly granted such power.82
Wheeler  and Williams  represent the trend during the three de-
cades before the Rehnquist Court, a period in which the Court
recognized the continuing vitality of the Cherokee Nation
cases.83  The principles that emerged from the Cherokee cases
did not remain static but rather evolved over time.84  As the
Court noted in Williams , these principles were modified where
tribal relations were not involved and where Indian rights were
not endangered.85  The restriction on state power, for example,
did not apply in cases where Indians were no longer on the reser-
vation.86  Moreover, those cases that supported limits on state
authority appeared at times to rely on federal preemption rather
than on the idea of inherent sovereignty.87
77 Id.
78 Id.  at 223 (citation omitted).
79 Id.  at 220.
80 See id.  at 223.
81 Id.
82 See id.  at 221.  (“Significantly, when Congress has wished the States to exercise
this power it has expressly granted them the jurisdiction which Worcester v. Georgia
had denied.”)
83 See generally  Getches, Beyond Indian Law , supra  note 7, at 272.
84 McClanahan v. Arizona Tax Comm’n, 411 U.S. 164, 171 (1973).
85 358 U.S. at 219-20.
86 See  411 U.S. at 171 (citing Oklahoma Tax Comm’n v. United States, 319 U.S.
598 (1943)).
87 See  411 U.S. at 172.
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These modifications, however, did not obscure the underlying
foundational principles. Indeed, in McClanahan v. Arizona Tax
Commission , the Court emphasized the significance of tribal sov-
ereignty “with its concomitant jurisdictional limit on the reach of
state law”88 when striking down Arizona’s attempt to impose an
income tax on a Navajo Indian whose income was derived from
reservation activities.  The Court’s comments in this regard de-
serve repeating:
It must always be remembered that the various Indian tribes
were once independent and sovereign nations, and that their
claim to sovereignty long predates that of our own Govern-
ment.  Indians today are American citizens.  They have the
right to vote, to use state courts, and they receive some state
services.  But it is nonetheless still true, as it was in the last
century, that “(t)he relation of the Indian tribes living within
the borders of the United States . . . (is) an anomalous one and
of a complex character . . . . They were, and always have been,
regarded as having a semi-independent position when they
preserved their tribal relations; not as States, not as nations,
not as possessed of the full attributes of sovereignty, but as a
separate people, with the power of regulating their internal and
social relations, and thus far not brought under the laws of the
Union or of the State within whose limits they resided .”89
This fundamental understanding of Indian sovereignty and the
limits on state power stands in sharp contrast to the approach of
the Rehnquist Court during the past two decades.  Recent cases90
have seriously eroded tribal sovereignty.  To accomplish this
shift, the Court “has forsaken not only [the] foundational cases,
but it has ignored most of the intervening 150 years of decisions,
including nearly all of its approximately eighty modern era deci-
sions.”91  Rather than relying on the Worcester  and Cherokee Na-
88 Id.  at 171.
89 Id.  at 172-73 (quoting United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 381-82 (1886))
(emphasis added) (footnotes omitted).  While McClanahan  involved state taxation
of Indians, its analysis and strong endorsement of tribal sovereignty might support a
similar ruling if the state attempted to impose an income tax on non-Indians for
income derived from reservation activities. See  Getches, Conquering the Cultural
Frontier , supra  note 7, at 1591.
90 See , e.g. , Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353 (2001); Atkinson Trading Co. v. Shirley,
532 U.S. 645 (2001); Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438 (1997); Idaho v. Coeur
d’Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. 261 (1997); Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996);
Hagen v. Utah, 510 U.S. 399 (1993); South Dakota v. Bourland, 508 U.S. 679 (1993);
Blatchford v. Native Vill., 501 U.S. 775 (1991).  Sarah Krakoff reported that since
1991, the Court has decided twenty-nine Indian law cases, and twenty-three of them
were decided against the tribe or tribal litigants.  Krakoff, supra  note 7, at 1178.
91 Getches, Beyond Indian Law , supra  note 7, at 274.  “Since the 1992 Term, only
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tion  line of cases, the current Court relies heavily on the
relatively recent decisions in Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian
Tribe92 and Montana v. United States93 to determine the extent of
tribal sovereignty.  Indeed, the Court appears to have simply dis-
regarded Worcester  and instead designated Montana  as the
“pathmarking case”94 in this area.
In both Oliphant and Montana , the Court confronted the issue
of tribal authority over nonmembers of a tribe.  The question in
Oliphant  was whether tribal court could exercise criminal juris-
diction over non-Indians who commit offenses on the reserva-
tion.95  The Tribe argued that tribal power in such circumstances
is an essential component of its inherent sovereignty.96  The
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals agreed, ruling that the “power to
preserve order on the reservation . . . is a sine qua non of the
sovereignty that the Suquamish originally possessed.”97  The Su-
preme Court, however, reversed, concluding that tribes do not
have inherent authority to exercise criminal jurisdiction over
non-Indians.98  The Court first determined that Congress had not
affirmatively authorized tribal court jurisdiction over non-Indi-
ans.99  It then found that, although not conclusive, the “com-
monly shared presumption of Congress, the Executive Branch,
and lower federal courts” was against such jurisdiction.100  Fi-
nally, the Court conceded that tribes retain elements of quasi-
sovereigns but noted that under Cherokee Nation  they cannot
exercise powers that are inconsistent with their dependent sta-
tus.101  The Court explained that Indian tribes come under the
territorial sovereignty of the United States and relinquish their
two majority opinions of the Supreme Court in Indian law have cited any of the
Marshall trilogy cases for support.” Id.
92 Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978).
93 Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544 (1981).
94 Strate , 520 U.S. at 445.
95 Oliphant , 435 U.S. at 195.
96 Id.  at 195-96.
97 Oliphant v. Schlie, 544 F.2d 1007, 1009 (9th Cir. 1976).
98 Oliphant , 435 U.S. at 212.  In Duro v. Reina , 495 U.S. 676, 688 (1990), the
Court extended Oliphant  and held that tribal courts could not exercise criminal ju-
risdiction over Indians who were not members of the tribe.  Congress overturned
Duro , making clear that tribal courts have criminal jurisdiction over Indians even if
they are not members of the tribe. See  25 U.S.C. § 1301(4) (1994). See also  Deloria
& Newton, supra  note 7.
99 435 U.S. at 195.
100 Id.  at 206.
101 Id.  at 208.
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power to the extent it might conflict with federal interests.102  In
the criminal context, the United States has an overriding interest
to ensure basic procedural and substantive protections to its citi-
zens, some of which are not required in tribal courts.103
In Montana ,104 the Court relied on Oliphant  in deciding
whether the Crow Tribe had power to regulate fishing and hunt-
ing by non-Indians on the reservation.  Both the Tribe and the
State asserted authority to regulate these activities of non-Indi-
ans.  The United States sued Montana to resolve the dispute,
seeking a declaratory judgment that the Tribe and United States
have sole regulatory authority within the reservation and an in-
junction directing Montana to obtain tribal permission to issue
hunting and fishing licenses within the reservation.105  At the out-
set, the Court agreed that the Tribe had authority to regulate,
and even prohibit, nonmembers from hunting or fishing on land
belonging to the Tribe or held by the United States in trust for
the Tribe.106  It ruled, however, that the Tribe had no authority to
regulate nonmembers who hunt or fish on reservation land
owned in fee by nonmembers of the Tribe.107  In so doing, it cited
Oliphant  for the general proposition that inherent tribal sover-
eignty does not extend to the activities of nonmembers.108  The
Court then recognized two exceptions to this general principle.
First, a tribe has inherent power to regulate the activities of non-
members who “enter consensual relationships with the tribe or
its members, through commercial dealing, contracts, leases, or
102 Id.  at 209.  The relinquishment of power is not voluntary but is part of the
colonial process. See  Frickey, Common Law , supra  note 7, at 37.  As Frickey ar-
gues, Oliphant represents an extension of the Marshall Court cases, which
considered tribes subservient to clear assertions of authority deemed neces-
sary to the colonizing government to conduct the colonial process effi-
ciently. Oliphant  involved no conflict of this sort.  Congress had never
outlawed tribal criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians, and such tribal con-
duct did not threaten to undermine Congress’s authority over Indian
affairs.
Id.  at 38.
103 See  Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376, 382-85 (1896).  The Indian Civil Rights Act,
25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-03 (1994), extends some constitutional provisions to Indian tribes.
104 Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544 (1981).
105 Id.  at 549.
106 Id.  at 557.
107 Id.  at 565-67.
108 Id.  at 565.  The Court used “nonmember” and “non-Indian” interchangeably.
See id.
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other arrangements.”109  Second, a tribe retains inherent sover-
eign power to regulate the conduct of non-Indians on fee land
within the reservation “when that conduct threatens or has some
direct effect on the political integrity, the economic security, or
the health or welfare of the tribe.”110  The Court found that
neither exception applied in this case.111  The non-Indian fisher-
men and hunters did not enter any kind of consensual relation-
ship with the Tribe.112  Additionally, there was no evidence that
non-Indian hunting and fishing on fee lands threatened the Crow
Tribe’s economic or political security.113
The significance of Oliphant  and Montana  lies not only in the
results but also in the method for finding restriction on tribal sov-
ereignty.  In both cases, the Court found that tribal sovereign
power was divested despite the absence of any explicit federal
legislation authorizing that determination.  It assumed a role for
the judiciary that had been reserved for Congress, thereby ignor-
ing its previous conclusion in Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock ,114 that
“[p]lenary authority over the tribal relations of the Indians has
been exercised by Congress from the beginning, and the power
has always been deemed a political one, not subject to be con-
trolled by the judicial department of the government.”115
In some respects, the decision in Montana  is more significant
than Oliphant  in its departure from the Cherokee cases. Mon-
tana  limits the civil regulatory power of the tribe, rather than
109 Id.  The Court cited Williams v. Lee , 358 U.S. 217, 223 (1959), as an example
of this exception.
110 Montana , 450 U.S. at 566.
111 See id.
112 Id.
113 Id.
114 Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 565 (1903).
115 Id. See also  United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 554 (1975), in which the
Court held that Congress had power to delegate to a tribe the authority to regulate
the distribution of liquor by non-Indians on fee land within the reservation.  The
Court concluded:
It is immaterial that respondent is not an Indian.  He was on the reserva-
tion and the transaction with an Indian took place there.  The cases in this
Court have consistently guarded the authority of Indian governments over
their reservations.  Congress recognized this authority in the Navajos in the
Treaty of 1868, and has done so ever since.  If this power is to be taken
away from them, it is for Congress to do it.
Id.  at 558 (quoting Lone Wolf , 187 U.S. at 564).  David Getches has argued that in
recent years the Court has assumed the role previously played by Congress in decid-
ing the scope of tribal powers. See  Getches, Conquering the Cultural Frontier , supra
note 7.
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criminal court jurisdiction, and thus has broader application.
More important, while citing Oliphant , the Court in Montana
abandoned the rationale underlying that decision. Oliphant  was
based on the articulated notion that tribes, as “domestic depen-
dent nations,” lost some of their inherent sovereignty, but only to
the federal government.  In later explaining Oliphant , the Court
was careful to note that tribal powers are not implicitly divested
by virtue of a tribe’s dependent status.116  Rather, the Court has
found such divestiture only in cases “where the exercise of tribal
sovereignty would be inconsistent with the overriding interests of
the National Government , as when the tribes seek to . . . prose-
cute non-Indians in tribal courts which do not accord the full pro-
tections of the Bill of Rights.”117  In Montana , there was no
overriding federal interest that would justify a loss of tribal sov-
ereignty.  Indeed, the United States brought the lawsuit on be-
half of the Crow Tribe, advocating that the Tribe had inherent
authority to regulate nonmember fishing and hunting, even on
fee held lands.118  In a subtle but important way, the Court rede-
fined the meaning of a tribe’s dependent status.  It announced
that “exercise of tribal power beyond what is necessary to protect
tribal self-government or to control internal relations is inconsis-
tent with the dependent status of the tribes. . . .”119  In this brief
statement, the Court eliminated the previous requirement of de-
fining that status in terms of the tribe’s relationship with the fed-
eral government.
It is possible to read Montana  narrowly as restricting tribal
sovereignty only over lands that are within the reservation and
held in fee by nonmembers.  Justice Stewart, writing for the
Court in that case, explicitly observed that the issue was a “nar-
row one.”120  To be sure, this reading excludes a large amount of
land from the reach of a tribe’s inherent sovereign powers.  Dur-
ing the Allotment Period, which began in 1887 with the passage
of the Dawes Act121 and ended in 1934 with the enactment of the
Indian Reorganization Act,122 the federal government engaged
in a massive effort to force assimilation of Indians by dividing
116 See  Washington v. Confederated Tribes, 447 U.S. 134, 153 (1980).
117 Id.  at 153-54 (emphasis added).
118 Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. at 544, 564 (1981).
119 Id.
120 Id.  at 557.
121 25 U.S.C. §§ 334, 339, 341, 342, 348, 349, 354, 381 (1994).
122 25 U.S.C. §§ 461-79 (1994).
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and allotting reservation lands.  Individual Indians received par-
cels of land, and the remaining surplus reservation land was then
opened to non-Indians.123  President Theodore Roosevelt de-
scribed the Dawes Act as “a mighty pulverizing engine to break
up the tribal mass.”124  The Act produced its intended results,
reducing the Indian land holdings from 138 million acres in 1887
to 52 million acres when the allotment policy ended forty-seven
years later.125  It also produced the checkerboard aspect of reser-
vations with some land held by the tribes or by the United States
in trust for the tribes, and other land held in fee by nonmembers
of the tribe.  This is a source of the problem in Montana , where
the Tribe attempted to regulate nonmember activities on fee held
land within the reservation borders.
Recent cases indicate that the Court does not intend to read
Montana  narrowly and that it has emerged as the governing case
in resolving claims of inherent tribal sovereignty.  In Strate v. A-1
Contractors ,126 the Court addressed the issue of whether a tribal
court had power to entertain a civil action brought against non-
members for injuries resulting from a car accident that occurred
on a public highway within the reservation.  The Court relied on
Montana  to resolve this issue even though Strate  involved a
tribe’s adjudicative powers, rather than its legislative author-
ity.127  The Court announced that “[a]s to nonmembers, we hold,
a tribe’s adjudicative jurisdiction does not exceed its legislative
jurisdiction.”128  It also ruled that Montana  governs notwith-
standing the fact that the land involved in Strate  was not fee land
but was land held by the United States in trust for the Tribe.129
On this point, the Court concluded that the right-of-way that
North Dakota acquired for the highway renders the land
“equivalent, for nonmember governance purposes, to alienated,
non-Indian land.”130
Having concluded that the Montana  rule applies, the Court
123 For a detailed discussion of Allotment, see COHEN, supra  note 20, at 612-28.
124 POMMERSHEIM, supra  note 7, at 19 (quoting STEVEN TYLER, A HISTORY OF
INDIAN POLICY 104 (1973)).
125 Id.  at 20.
126 Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438, 442 (1997).
127 See id.
128 Id.  at 453.  In Nevada v. Hicks , 533 U.S. 353, 358 (2001), the Court noted that
this “formulation leaves open the question whether a tribe’s adjudicative jurisdiction
over nonmember defendants equals  its legislative jurisdiction.”
129 Id.  at 456.
130 Id.  at 454.
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held that the tribal courts lack power to entertain the lawsuit.131
It found that the exercise of authority did not fall within either of
the Montana  exceptions.132  It determined that the dispute does
not fit within the exception that allows tribal authority where
nonmembers have entered into a consensual commercial rela-
tionship with the tribe.133  This case arose out of a highway acci-
dent that did not involve the Tribe or any consensual relations
with the Tribe.134  The dispute, the Court concluded, also did not
threaten the political integrity, economic security, or health and
welfare of the Tribe.135  With respect to this exception, the Court
noted that those who drive negligently on highways running
through a reservation certainly might jeopardize the safety of tri-
bal members.136  However, the second exception does not extend
to this kind of interest.137  Construing the exception narrowly,
the Court held that it applies only where the tribal interest re-
lates directly to self-government: “what is necessary to protect
tribal self-government or to control internal relations.”138 Tribal
court jurisdiction in this matter, it concluded, is not necessary to
protect the right of self-government.139  As a result, the plaintiffs
were forced to take their case to state court, which would resolve
the dispute that arose on Indian country.
Montana  also served as the basis for the Court’s determination
in Atkinson Trading Co. v. Shirley140 that the Navajo Nation
lacked authority to impose an occupancy tax on nonmembers
who stay at a hotel that is located on fee land within the Navajo
reservation.141 Relying on the general proposition adopted in
Montana , the Court concluded without difficulty142 that the Na-
tion had no inherent143 authority to impose the tax because the
131 Id.  at 453.
132 Id.  at 459.  The Court recognized that Congress could authorize the exercise of
tribal power but did not do so in this case. See id.  at 453.
133 Id.  at 457.
134 Id.
135 Id.  at 459.
136 Id.  at 458.
137 Id.
138 Id.  at 459 (quoting Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 564 (1981)).
139 Id.
140 Atkinson Trading Co. v. Shirley, 532 U.S. 645 (2001).
141 Id.  at 659.  With respect to the scope of tribal authority to tax activities on the
reservation, see generally Washington v. Confederated Tribes, 447 U.S. 134 (1980).
142 The Court stated that, “as in Strate , we apply Montana  straight up.” Atkinson ,
532 U.S. at 654.
143 Congress had not authorized the tax by statute or treaty. Id.  at 659.
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nonmember activity occurred on non-Indian fee land.144  The sig-
nificance of the status of the land was underscored when the
Court in Atkinson  distinguished Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache
Tribe ,145 which upheld a severance tax imposed by the Tribe on
non-Indian lessees who extracted oil and gas from tribal lands.
The difference between Atkinson  and Merrion  lies in the fact
that the latter involved activity occurring on tribal lands.146
The Navajo Nation could prevail in Atkinson  only if it estab-
lished that the activity fell within one of the Montana  exceptions.
The Nation argued that the hotel proprietor, who was required to
collect and remit the tax to the Navajos, and the guests have en-
tered into a consensual relationship with the Nation.147  The ho-
tel and its guests benefit from police, fire, and medical services
provided by the Navajos, thus justifying imposition of the tax.148
The Court determined, however, that the availability of tribal
services does not create the requisite connection between the
Tribe and the nonmember and, thus, is insufficient to sustain tri-
bal civil authority over nonmembers on fee land.149  Similarly, it
failed to see how the operation of the hotel threatens the politi-
cal integrity, economic security, or health and welfare of the
Nation.150
The Court’s most recent treatment151 of tribal power exposes
the extent of the judicially imposed erosion of Indian tribal sov-
ereignty.  In Montana , the Court “readily” agreed that the Tribe
could regulate the activities of nonmembers on land that belongs
to the Tribe or is held in trust for the Tribe.152 Montana  ad-
dressed the narrow question of the scope of tribal power over
nonmember activity on reservation land owned in fee by non-
members.153  Moreover in Strate , the Court was careful to stress
that the stretch of highway was similar to nonmember fee land.154
144 Id.
145 See  Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130 (1982).
146 Atkinson , 532 U.S. at 653.
147 Id.  at 654.
148 Id.  at 654-55.
149 Id.  at 655.  The Court also rejected the suggestion that the hotel proprietor
consented to the tax. Id.  at 656.
150 Id.  at 657.
151 Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353 (2001).
152 Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 557 (1981).
153 Id.
154 See  Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438, 454 (1997).
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In the recent decision of Nevada v. Hicks ,155 the Court aban-
doned even this pretense regarding the status of the land.
In Hicks , the issue was whether the tribal court had power to
entertain a civil action brought by a tribal member against state
game wardens who entered tribal land to execute a search war-
rant for evidence of a crime committed off the reservation.156
Although the precise issue concerned the tribal court’s power,
the Court treated the inquiry as whether the tribe had regulatory
authority over state officers who enter tribal lands, noting that a
tribe’s adjudicative jurisdiction does not exceed its regulatory
power.157  Hicks and the United States as amicus argued that be-
cause the activity occurred on tribal land, the Tribe could exer-
cise regulatory authority over nonmembers as part of its inherent
sovereignty.158  In a rather cryptic fashion, Justice Scalia’s major-
ity opinion responded:  “Not necessarily.”159  He stated that
Montana’s  general rule of no inherent authority over nonmem-
bers applies to both Indian and non-Indian land.160  The status of
the land is not a dispositive factor in deciding whether to apply
Montana ’s general rule but is “only one factor to consider in de-
termining whether regulation of the activities of nonmembers is
‘necessary to protect tribal self-government or to control internal
relations.’”161
The shift here is significant.  While the previous opinions were
not models of clarity,162 they seemed to support the proposition
that the status of the land triggered the application of a presump-
tion regarding tribal authority over nonmembers.  A tribe was
presumed to have inherent powers over nonmember activities
155 Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353 (2001).
156 Id.  at 355.  The search warrant that was the subject of the suit was issued by
the state court and was authorized by the tribal court as well. Id.  at 356.  Tribal
officers and state wardens searched Hicks’ home but found no evidence to support
the claim that he had illegally killed bighorn sheep. Id.  Hicks sued the Tribal Judge,
the tribal officers, the Tribe, the state wardens, and the State asserting tortuous con-
duct as well as constitutional violations by the defendants. Id.  at 356-57.  When the
case reached the Supreme Court, the only remaining claims were against the state
wardens in their individual capacities. Id.  at 357.
157 Id.  at 357-58.  While the Court cited Strate  for the proposition that a tribe’s
adjudicative jurisdiction does not exceed its legislative jurisdiction, id. , it left open
the question whether the two are equal, see id.  at 374.
158 Id.  at 359.
159 Id.
160 Id.  at 360.
161 Id.
162 See , e.g. , Brendale v. Confederated Tribes & Bands, 492 U.S. 408 (1989).
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occurring on tribal land or land held in trust for the tribe unless
such authority was divested by Congress or by virtue of the
tribe’s dependent status.  Conversely, in the absence of congres-
sional authorization, a tribe was presumed to have no inherent
authority over nonmember activities on fee held land within the
reservation unless the activities are consensual or relate directly
to tribal self-government.  Under Hicks , the presumption is
against inherent tribal sovereignty over nonmembers regardless
of the status of the land.163  To prevail, a tribe must establish that
the exercise of inherent164 sovereignty fits within one of the
Montana exceptions, and the status of the land is relevant only in
determining the applicability of the exceptions.
It is possible that Hicks  will be read narrowly in the future and
applied only in instances where the tribe attempts to exercise au-
thority over state officials on tribal land.  The majority stated that
the holding is limited to the issue of jurisdiction over state offi-
cials, and that it leaves open the general question of tribal juris-
diction over nonmembers.165  Moreover, there is some language
in the majority opinion suggesting that the Court was especially
concerned about subjecting state officers to tribal regulatory or
adjudicative authority.  Justice Scalia stated, for example, that tri-
bal ownership of the land was not dispositive when weighed
against the “State’s interest in pursuing off-reservation violations
of its laws.”166  At another point in the opinion, he observed that
self-government and internal relations were not at issue because
the issue concerned the application of tribal authority over a
“narrow category of outsiders.”167 Similarly, he noted that when
Montana  referred to consensual arrangements it meant private
arrangements and “did not have in mind States or state officers
acting in their governmental capacity . . . .”168 Also, in response
to Justice O’Connor’s concurring opinion, Scalia wrote that the
majority does not say that state officers cannot be regulated by
the tribe but only that “they cannot be regulated in the perform-
ance of their law-enforcement duties.  Action unrelated to that is
potentially subject to tribal control depending on the outcome of
163 Hicks , 533 U.S. at 376.
164 The Hicks  Court recognized that Congress could confer regulatory power. See
id. at 359.
165 Id.  at 358 n.2.
166 Id.  at 370.
167 Id.  at 371.
168 Id.  at 372.
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Montana  analysis.”169
Despite such limiting language, there is good reason to fear
that Justice O’Connor is correct in warning that the majority is-
sued a broad holding that substantially altered the principles gov-
erning tribal sovereignty.170  Justice Scalia’s opinion quoted
White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker171 for the proposition
that the Court long ago departed from Chief Justice Marshall’s
view that state law has no force within the reservation.172  How-
ever, in so doing, he omitted that Bracker  followed this proposi-
tion with the statement that “[a]t the same time we have
recognized that the Indian tribes retain ‘attributes of sovereignty
over both their members and  their territory.’”173
The majority’s treatment of National Farmers Union Insurance
Cos. v. Crow Tribe of Indians174 provides a further sign that Jus-
tice O’Connor’s concern in Hicks  was legitimate. National Farm-
ers Union , a case decided sixteen years before Hicks , involved a
federal court action by nonmembers challenging the power of a
tribal court to hear a civil action against them.175  The Court
adopted a prudential rule requiring the federal court in such cir-
cumstances to “stay its hand” until the tribal court has an oppor-
tunity to determine its own jurisdiction.176  Two years later, in
explaining the National Farmers Union exhaustion rule, the
Court explicitly recognized that “[t]ribal authority over the activ-
ities of non-Indians on reservation lands is an important part of
tribal sovereignty” and that tribal courts presumptively have civil
jurisdiction over cases arising from these activities.177 Hicks ,
however, appears to modify the National Farmers Union  rule by
169 Id.  at 373.
170 See id.  at 401 (O’Connor, J., concurring).  Although Justice O’Connor, joined
by Justices Stevens and Breyer, concurred in the result on the basis of official immu-
nity, her opinion dissented from much of the majority’s reformulation of Montana .
See id.
171 White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 141 (1980).
172 Hicks , 533 U.S. at 361.
173 Bracker , 448 U.S. at 142 (quoting United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 557
(1975)) (emphasis added).  Justice Scalia explains Worcester  as based on treaty lan-
guage guaranteeing the Cherokees that they would not be subjected to state jurisdic-
tion. Hicks , 533 U.S. at 361 n.4.
174 Nat’l Farmers Union Ins. Cos. v. Crow Tribe, 471 U.S. 845 (1985).
175 Id.  at 847.
176 Id.  at 857.
177 Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9, 18 (1987).  For a discussion of Iowa
Mutual  and National Farmers Union , see Frank R. Pommersheim, The Crucible of
Sovereignty:  Analyzing Issues of Tribal Jurisdiction , 31 ARIZ. L. REV. 329 (1989).
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finding that exhaustion is unnecessary if tribal sovereignty does
not reach the activity that gives rise to the lawsuit.178  The Court
made clear in Hicks  that National Farmers Union  was not meant
to expand the scope of inherent sovereignty conferred by the
Montana  line of cases.
Another indication of the breath of the majority opinion is the
way it simply glossed over the fact that by the time the case
reached the Supreme Court the only issue concerned tribal au-
thority over state officials in their personal capacities.  It is well
settled that while state officials may not be sued for damages in
their official capacities, they may be sued in their personal capac-
ities, as such suits are not barred by the Eleventh Amendment.179
In personal capacity suits, the state’s interest is weaker because
the public officials are held personally liable and any payment is
not from public funds.  Certainly, imposing liability on state of-
ficers even in their personal capacities may have an effect on the
performance of public duties.  This concern, however, is ad-
dressed not by dismissing the lawsuit but by allowing the officials
to assert a qualified immunity.180  In its haste to reach the under-
lying sovereignty issue, the Hicks  majority ignored this body of
law, stating that the distinction between personal and official ca-
pacity suits is “irrelevant.”181  By reaching out to decide the sov-
ereignty question, the Court signaled that it may be focused on
much more than the limited issue of tribal power over state
officers.
Finally, three of the Justices in the Hicks  majority—Justices
Souter, Kennedy and Thomas—were prepared to make explicit
that a tribe’s inherent sovereign powers do not extend to any
nonmembers, whether state officers or private parties, unless the
activity falls within one of the Montana  exceptions.182  In all
cases, under their view, the status of the land would simply be a
factor in applying the exceptions.183  The current Court has not
178 See Hicks , 533 U.S. at 369. See also  Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438,
453 (1997).
179 Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 31 (1991).
180 Id.
181 533 U.S. at 365.  The majority paraphrased an 1879 opinion, Tennessee v. Da-
vis , 100 U.S. 257, 263 (1879), for the proposition that a state can act only through its
officers and that to impose liability might interfere with governmental operations.  It
also mentioned that permitting damages suits might inhibit public officials.  533 U.S.
at 365.  These concerns, of course, were addressed in Hafer .
182 Id.  at 375 (Souter, J. concurring).
183 Id.  at 375-76.
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yet addressed the issue but it appears ready to apply Montana  to
any nonmember activity even on land held by the tribe or by the
United States in trust for the tribe.
It is noteworthy that in Montana  and the more recent cases,
the Court announced limitations on Indian sovereignty without
finding any congressional support for its pronouncements.184  In
a related series of cases, the Court attempted to justify its restric-
tions on Indian sovereignty by finding that Congress intended
the result.  The Court found in some circumstances, for example,
that Congress intended to diminish the reservation area and,
thus, open it to state regulation.185  Similarly, in other instances,
the Court determined that Congress intended to abrogate spe-
cific treaty rights, thereby restricting the tribe’s powers.186
Commentators have offered a variety of explanations for the
Court’s abandonment of the Cherokee cases, its erosion of tribal
sovereignty, and the related elevated role for state authority.
Frank Pommersheim suggested, for example, that the trend can
be explained in terms of the role of private property rights.187
The allotment period not only altered tribal jurisdiction but also
granted individual property rights to nonmembers on fee lands.
He argued that the Court appears to treat that “bundle of rights”
as including the “‘right’ to be free from tribal regulation in cer-
tain activities that have a ‘private’ character (such as hunting and
fishing or basic land use), unless such activities go too far, butting
up against the concerns set out in the Montana  proviso.”188
While Pommersheim does not mention it, such a concern for the
individual property interests of non-tribal members is consistent
with the more general private property rights theme reflected in
takings clause cases.189  Interestingly, the sovereignty cases re-
veal that the Court does not appear to have an equally high re-
gard for the property interests of Indian tribes.190
184 See generally  Getches, Conquering the Cultural Frontier , supra  note 7.
185 See , e.g. , South Dakota v. Yankton Sioux Tribe, 522 U.S. 329, 358 (1998). See
generally , Laurence, supra  note 7.
186 See , e.g. , South Dakota v. Bourland, 508 U.S. 679, 697 (1993).
187 POMMERSHEIM, supra  note 7, at 151.
188 Id.
189 See , e.g. , Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606 (2001); Dolan v. City of
Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994); Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
But see  Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency,
535 U.S. 302 (2002).
190 See  Joseph William Singer, Sovereignty and Property , 86 NW. U. L. REV. 1, 3
(1991) (stating that Indian law cases can “teach us a great deal about both the social
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The recent Indian law developments are also consistent with
the federalism jurisprudence that is a fundamental component of
the Court’s agenda.191  Relying on the Tenth Amendment,192 the
Eleventh Amendment,193 a narrow interpretation of congres-
sional power,194 and “postulates implicit in the constitutional de-
sign,”195 the current Court has been a steadfast champion of
states’ rights.  Two of the leading federalism cases arise in the
Indian law context.196  While the cases following Montana  do not
invoke federalism principles directly, the results in these cases
are in harmony with the states’ rights theme, not simply eroding
tribal power but also expanding state jurisdiction in Indian
country.
The Montana  line of cases might also be viewed as another
example of the current Court’s renewed judicial activism at the
expense of congressional power.197  That activism is perhaps best
represented in the recent cases striking down federal statutes as
beyond the scope of congressional power under the Commerce
Clause or the Fourteenth Amendment.198  The recent tribal sov-
ereignty cases have not directly addressed the scope of congres-
sional power.  The results, however, fit within the judicial activist
trend.  Historically, Congress regulated Indian affairs and restric-
tions on inherent tribal powers were matters for congressional,
meaning of property rights and about the just and unjust exercise of governmental
power.”); Rebecca Tsosie, Land, Culture, and Community:  Reflections on Native
Sovereignty and Property in America , 34 IND. L. REV. 1291, 1298 (2001) (stating:
“The Supreme Court’s recent jurisprudence jeopardizes remaining tribal rights to
land and political autonomy.”).
191 See  Getches, Beyond Indian Law , supra  note 7.
192 U.S. CONST. amend. X. See , e.g. , New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144
(1992).
193 U.S. CONST. amend. XI. See , e.g. , Bd. of Trs. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001);
Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000); Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S.
44 (1996).
194 See, e.g. , Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank,
527 U.S. 627 (1999).
195 Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 729 (1999). See also  Fed. Mar. Comm’n v.
South Carolina State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743 (2002). See generally  Daan
Braveman, Enforcement of Federal Rights Against the States: Alden and Federalism
Non-Sense , 49 AM. U. L. REV. 611 (2000).
196 See  Idaho v. Coeur d’Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. 261 (1997); Seminole Tribe v. Flor-
ida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996). See generally  Martha A. Field, The Seminole Case, Federal-
ism, and the Indian Commerce Clause , 29 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 3 (1997).
197 See  Getches, Beyond Indian Law , supra  note 7.
198 See , e.g. , Bd. of Trs. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001); Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Re-
gents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000); United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000); Printz v.
United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
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not judicial, action.199  As David Getches argues in reviewing the
Indian law developments, the Court has now usurped that role
for itself, “considering and weighing cases to reach results com-
porting with the Justices’ subjective notions of what the Indian
jurisdictional situation ought to be.”200
In a separate attempt to explain the judicial trend, Scott Gould
argues that the Court has moved from a concept of Indian sover-
eignty based on land to a notion premised on consent.201  Under
this model, inherent sovereignty extends to tribal members be-
cause they have implicitly or explicitly consented to the exercise
of tribal power.  Similarly, tribal sovereignty exists over those
nonmembers who have entered into a consensual relationship
with the tribe.  Gould wrote:  “This judicial shift from territory to
consent suggests that a new paradigm, the consent paradigm, has
substantially replaced inherent sovereignty.”202
Finally, Philip Frickey, in his recent review of tribal sover-
eignty and the Court’s divestiture of tribal power over nonmem-
bers, concluded that there really is no coherent theory that can
explain the trend.203  He agreed that the Court has been assum-
ing authority in an area previously thought to be within the scope
of Congress’ responsibilities.204  Moreover, as he stated, “A half-
millennium after the colonial process began, in our time of great
skepticism concerning colonization, our least democratic branch
has become our most enthusiastic colonial agent.”205  In the end,
however, he found that the case law is “muddled” and is “more
an unreflective judicial trend rooted in apparent uneasiness with
tribal authority than a paradigmatic, entrenched doctrinal
shift.”206
II
THEM AND US
Whether or not the trend can be explained by a consistent the-
ory, it does signal a judicial retreat from earlier cases supporting
inherent tribal sovereignty.  This section explores the suggestion
199 See  COHEN, supra  note 20, at 217-20.
200 Getches, Conquering the Cultural Frontier , supra  note 7, at 1573.
201 Gould, supra  note 7, at 814.
202 Id.
203 Frickey, Common Law , supra  note 7, at 81.
204 Id.  at 7.
205 Id.  (footnotes omitted).
206 Id.  at 8.
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that despite this retreat and the apparent shift in doctrine, a com-
mon theme is found in both the older and the modern cases.
From the Marshall trilogy to the present, the Court’s treatment
of tribal sovereignty has been premised on an underlying concep-
tion of Indian identity that assumes Indian peoples are the
“other.”  While the cases do not fit a pattern perfectly, they seem
to incorporate an implicit understanding of Indians as “them”
rather than “us,” to use Reagan’s terms.
The construction of “Indian-ness” embodied in the cases is
more than simply a literal distinction between Indians and non-
Indians.  Rather, it is an understanding of Indians as either being
different or assimilated.  The Court appears more likely to recog-
nize inherent tribal sovereignty when it views Indian peoples as
different, and is less likely to do so when it perceives Indians as
behaving like dominant groups by, for example, engaging in eco-
nomic development activities.  This view of Indian identity fore-
closes the possibility that Indian peoples might choose to be
both, to behave like dominant groups in some respects while pre-
serving their cultural and political differences.
The Marshall trilogy itself illustrates the Court’s assumption of
difference in resolving the sovereignty issues.  While Worcester
included a strong, perhaps the strongest, statement in support of
Indian sovereignty, it was built on a foundation of racism and on
conceptions of Indians as different.  Only nine years before
Worcester , Chief Justice Marshall wrote the opinion in Johnson v.
McIntosh ,207 which held that Indian tribes did not have power to
convey title to their own land.  In Johnson, Marshall relied on
the principle that discovery gave to the discovering nation the
sole right to acquire the land from the native peoples and estab-
lish settlements.208  The European nations used the discovery
doctrine to take as much land as they could obtain and to avoid
war with each other.209  Marshall incorporated the discovery doc-
trine into the law of the United States, observing that the rights
held by the British passed to the United States.210  He concluded
207 Johnson v. McIntosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 604-05 (1823).
208 Id.  at 572-73.
209 Id.  at 573.
210 Id.  at 588.  Marshall stated:  “The British Government, which was then our
government, and whose rights have passed to the United States, asserted title to all
the lands occupied by Indians, within the chartered limits of the British colonies.  It
asserted also a limited sovereignty over them, and the exclusive right of extinguish-
ing the titles which occupancy gave to them.” Id.
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that “[c]onquest gives a title which the courts of the conqueror
cannot deny, whatever the private and speculative opinions of
individuals may be, respecting the original justice of the claim
which has been successfully asserted.”211  As Robert Williams
has persuasively described, Marshall employed the language of
conquest to legalize the “colonizing crusade against the Ameri-
can Indians . . . .”212
The Johnson  Court explicitly invoked notions of difference in
justifying its decision.  Marshall observed that in the normal
course, the conquering nations impose limits on themselves, rec-
ognizing that the conquered should not be oppressed because
they are usually assimilated into the nation.213  He explained:
“The new and old members of the society mingle with each
other; the distinction between them is gradually lost, and they
make one people.  Where this incorporation is practicable, hu-
manity demands, and wise policy requires, that the rights of the
conquered to property should remain unimpaired . . . .”214  This
general approach to the relations of the conqueror and con-
quered, however, could not apply to the Indians, according to
Marshall.215  He described Indians as “fierce savages”216 and as a
“people with whom it was impossible to mix . . . .”217  Finally, in
denying Indians the natural right to dispose of property, Marshall
relied on their difference, which he described as part of the “ac-
tual state of things . . . .”218  He conceded that the Court’s deci-
sion denying Indians the right to transfer their property may be
“opposed to natural right, and to the usages of civilized nations”
but found such a determination is indispensable given the “actual
condition of the two people . . . .”219
Marshall and the Supreme Court, of course, did not invent the
Indian as the “savage” but rather continued a view traced from
the very early European settlers.  Rennard Strickland reported
211 Id.  As a result of Johnson , “Indian title,” sometimes referred to as “aboriginal
title,” is a right of occupancy subject to the federal government’s power to extinguish
that right. COHEN, supra  note 20, at 487.
212 ROBERT A. WILLIAMS, JR., THE AMERICAN INDIAN IN WESTERN LEGAL
THOUGHT 317 (1990).
213 Johnson , 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) at 1589.
214 Id.
215 Id.  at 590.
216 Id.
217 Id.
218 Id.  at 591.
219 Id.  at 591-92.
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that woodcuts published in 1509 portray the Indian as a savage
and that early sixteenth century settlers described the Indian in
subhuman terms.220 Strickland wrote:
There is little distinction in these sixteenth-century accounts
between the discussion of the “savage Indians” and the exotic
birds and flowers of the New World.  In truth, the Indian is
seen as a different but equally strange variety of new
fauna. . . . In this age, considerable time was spent among the
ecclesiastics and academics debating the question:  Are Indi-
ans really people?221
In Johnson , Marshall incorporated this portrait of the Indian
into our law.
The difference theme also served as the justification for declar-
ing in Cherokee Nation  that Indian tribes are “domestic depen-
dent nations” and that their relation to the United States
resembles that of a “ward to his guardian.”222  Chief Justice Mar-
shall noted that the relationship between the Indians and the
United States is “unlike that of any other two people in exis-
tence” and “is marked by peculiar and cardinal distinctions
which exist no where else.”223  Additionally, he noted that the
Court could not disregard “the habits and usages of the Indians,
in their intercourse with their white neighbors . . . .”224  In his
separate opinion, Justice Johnson described Indian tribes as
“nothing more than wandering hordes, held together only by ties
of blood and habit, and having neither laws or government, be-
yond what is required in a savage state.”225  At another point, he
argued that the designation as a state could not be applied to “a
people so low in the grade of organized society as our Indian
tribes most generally are.”226
In Worcester  as well, the Court understood Indian tribes to be
different and separate from any dominant group.  Indeed, that
distinctiveness was the very basis for concluding that Georgia
laws had no force on Cherokee land.  The Court observed that
“Indian nations had always been considered as distinct, indepen-
dent political communities. . . . The very term ‘nation,’ so gener-
220 STRICKLAND, supra  note 13, 123-24.
221 Id.  at 124.
222 Cherokee National v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 17 (1831).
223 Id.  at 16.
224 Id.  at 18.
225 Id.  at 27-28.
226 Id.  at 21.
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ally applied to them, means ‘a people distinct from others.’”227
Similarly, the distinctive characteristic of Indian tribes was re-
flected in the fact that the United States entered into treaties
with the Indians.228  So too, the Court relied on congressional
enactments that treated tribes as distinct communities as a basis
for its decision.229  One of the statutes mentioned by the Court
was passed for the purpose of “‘introducing among [the Indians]
the habits and arts of civilization . . . .’”230
The concept of the reservation itself grew out of a desire to
separate Indians from the rest of the population. The reservation
was not unique to the United States but was used throughout the
hemisphere to isolate native peoples with the intent of someday
teaching them the ways of the dominant culture.231  In the
United States, the federal government used the reservation to
separate Indians for the immediate purpose of preventing vio-
lence between the Indians and the settlers.232  Initially, the Indi-
ans were removed to the West, outside of the states; but after the
Civil War, federal policy established reservations as “jurisdic-
tional islands”233 within the states.  In Ex parte Crow Dog ,234 the
Court recognized the sovereignty of these jurisdictional islands
when it held that the Sioux tribe had exclusive power to punish
one of its members for the murder of another member on the
reservation.  For our purposes, it is instructive to note that in en-
dorsing a relatively235 broad view of tribal sovereignty, Crow
Dog , like Worcester , invoked distinct images of the Indian.  The
Court observed that Indians were viewed as a “dependent com-
munity who were in a state of pupilage, advancing from the con-
dition of a savage tribe to that of a people who, through the
discipline of labor, and by education, it was hoped might become
227 Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 559 (1832).
228 Id.  at 559.
229 Id.  at 556-57.
230 Id.  at 557.
231 NATIVE AMERICAN TESTIMONY, supra  note 10, at 171.
232 POMMERSHEIM, supra note 7, at 165.
233 Clinton, supra  note 35, at 165.
234 Ex parte  Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556, 572 (1883).
235 The Court did not hold that Congress lacked power to limit tribal sovereignty
but rather concluded that Congress had not done so. See COHEN, supra  note 20, at
236.  Two years later, in 1885, Congress enacted a law giving the federal courts
power over major crimes committed on Indian country and over the murder of one
Indian by another. Id.  at 236-37; see  18 U.S.C. § 1153 (1994). See generally  Lone
Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553 (1903) (upholding congressional power to abrogate
treaty rights and alter reservation boundaries).
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a self-supporting and self-governed society.”236
During the allotment period,237 the federal government en-
gaged in a program to dismantle the reservations and force as-
similation of Indian peoples.  “The ultimate goal of the allotment
policy was the cultural extinction of tribalism, with the individu-
alized Indians joining the broader American citizenry as self-sup-
porting citizens.”238 Among other things, allotment opened
reservation land to non-Indians and created the checkerboard
pattern that mixes fee lands and tribal lands.  As Philip Frickey
points out, tribal sovereignty developed in a relatively simple
context, when reservations were for Indians only.239  Allotment,
he observes, undermined the simple “‘we/they’”240 context of
sovereignty issues by opening reservation lands to non-Indians.
Although the official allotment policy ended in 1934, the “leg-
acy of allotment” is found in the modern day cases241 finding
congressional intent to diminish the boundaries of a reserva-
tion.242  The controlling principle in these cases is that only Con-
gress has power to diminish the boundaries of a reservation, and
diminishment is not to be “lightly inferred.”243  The issue in each
case is a matter of congressional intent. Interestingly, however,
the Court does not rely simply on statutory language or contem-
poraneous understandings but also on events that transpired af-
ter the enactment of the law.244  The Court recognized that such
reliance on post-enactment events is “an unorthodox and poten-
tially unreliable method of statutory interpretation.”245  Never-
theless, it resorts to Congress’s own treatment of the affected
land area in the years after the enactment as well as to subse-
quent demographic data to determine whether Congress in-
tended to diminish the reservation area.  The Court said that
236 Crow Dog , 109 U.S. at 569.
237 See supra  text accompanying notes 121-25.
238 WILKINS, supra  note 7, at 281.
239 Frickey, Common Law , supra  note 7, at 14.
240 Id.  at 16.
241 See , e.g. , South Dakota v. Yankton Sioux Tribe, 522 U.S. 329 (1998); Hagen v.
Utah, 510 U.S. 399 (1994); Solem v. Bartlett, 465 U.S. 463 (1984).  In the Montana
line of cases, the Court limited tribal sovereignty by restricting power over nonmem-
bers on reservation lands.  In the diminishment cases, the Court limited sovereignty
by reducing the land area of the reservation itself. See  Laurence, supra  note 7, at
796.
242 Royster, supra  note 7.
243 Solem , 465 U.S. at 470.
244 Id.  at 471.
245 Id.  at 472 n.13.
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“[w]here non-Indian settlers flooded into the opened portion of a
reservation and the area has long since lost its Indian character ,
we have acknowledged that de facto , if not de jure , diminishment
may have occurred.”246
Thus, in concluding that a 1902 congressional enactment in-
tended to diminish the Unitah Indian Reservation, the Court re-
lied in part on the fact that the current population of the area was
eighty-five percent non-Indian.247  Similarly, the Court relied on
contemporary demographic data from the 1990s in holding that
nearly 100 years earlier Congress intended to diminish the Yank-
ton Sioux reservation.248  The lesson of these cases is clear:  the
Court is more likely to find diminished reservation areas and to
restrict tribal sovereignty when a geographic area looks more
like “us” and less like “them.”249
The them/us theme is repeated in the Court’s discussion of tri-
bal courts.  In Ex parte Crow Dog ,250 the Court concluded that
tribal courts had exclusive jurisdiction to try tribal members who
commit crimes against other tribal members on reservation land.
In doing so, the Court observed that it would be unfair to subject
an Indian to federal court jurisdiction and to try him under fed-
eral law.251  Although the decision supported tribal sovereignty,
it did so by invoking notions of difference and images of Indians
as savages.  The Court stated:
It is a case where . . . law . . . is sought to be extended over
aliens and strangers; over the members of a community, sepa-
rated by race, by tradition, by the instincts of a free though
savage life, from the authority and power which seeks to im-
pose upon them the restraints of an external and unknown
code, and to subject them to the responsibilities of civil con-
duct, according to rules and penalties of which they could have
no previous warning; which judges them by a standard made
by others, and not for them, which takes no account of the
conditions which should except them from its exactions, and
makes no allowance for their inability to understand it.  It tries
them not by their peers, nor by the customs of their people,
nor the law of their land, but by superiors of a different race,
246 Id.  at 471 (emphasis added).
247 Hagen v. Utah, 510 U.S. 399, 421 (1994).
248 South Dakota v. Yankton Sioux Tribe, 522 U.S. 329, 349 (1998).
249 For a general critique of the diminishment doctrine, see Laurence, supra  note
7.
250 Ex parte  Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556, 572 (1883). Crow Dog  was decided before
enactment of the Major Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (1994), which now gives fed-
eral courts jurisdiction over such matters.
251 Crow Dog , 109 U.S. at 571.
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according to the law of a social state of which they have an
imperfect conception, and which is opposed to the traditions
of their history, to the habits of their lives, to the strongest
prejudices of their savage nature; one which measures the red
man’s revenge by the maxims of the white man’s morality.252
Remarkably, nearly a century later, the Court relied on these
very considerations in concluding in Oliphant253 that tribal courts
lacked criminal jurisdiction to try non-Indians who commit
crimes on tribal lands.  There, the Court cited the above passage
from Crow Dog  and then stated that “[t]hese considerations, ap-
plied here to the non-Indian rather than Indian offender, speak
equally strongly against the validity of respondents’ contention
that Indian tribes . . . retain the power to try non-Indians accord-
ing to their own customs and procedure.”254  Perhaps aware of
the disturbing implications of relying verbatim on this passage,
Oliphant  omitted the references to “savage life” and “savage na-
ture.”255  Nevertheless, the implication remains:  just as it is un-
fair to subject “savages separated by race and tradition” to the
laws of the United States, it is unfair to subject non-Indians to
the laws of the “savage Indians.”  Whatever the appeal of this
kind of symmetry, it is evident that in 1978 the Court continued
to rely on a conception of the Indian as different in resolving a
dispute over inherent sovereignty.
The Court exhibited this distrust of tribal courts again in
Duro ,256 where it held that Oliphant ’s restriction on tribal court
sovereignty is not limited to non-Indians but also applies to all
nonmembers.257  The Court conceded that modern tribal courts
have many features of non-tribal courts but noted that “they are
influenced by the unique customs, languages, and usages of the
tribes they serve.”258  Justice Souter, joined by Justices Kennedy
and Thomas, subsequently adopted this theme in their concur-
ring opinion in Hicks , stating that tribal courts are different from
other American courts and from one another in structure, appli-
252 Id.
253 Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 195 (1978).
254 Id.  at 211.
255 See id.  at 210-11.
256 Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676 (1990).
257 Id.  at 688.  Congress reversed this determination, providing that tribal courts
have criminal jurisdiction over all Indians. See  Criminal Jurisdiction over Indians,
Pub. L. No. 102-137, 105 Stat. 646 (1991).
258 Duro , 495 U.S. at 693.  For an excellent discussion of tribal courts, see POM-
MERSHEIM, supra  note 7.
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cable substantive law, and independence of their judiciary.259
The Court’s treatment of the second Montana  exception is an-
other example of an implicit reliance on the them/us construc-
tion.  The exception authorizes tribal power over nonmembers
when their conduct “threatens or has some direct effect on the
political integrity, the economic security, or the health or welfare
of the tribe.”260  Such an exception is broad, and could be inter-
preted to justify, for example, tribal authority over nonmembers
who drive recklessly on Indian country and thereby threaten the
safety of tribal members.  In Strate , however, the Court rejected
a broad reading and instead concluded that the exception applies
only when tribal authority is necessary to protect tribal self-gov-
ernment and internal affairs;261 in other words, when necessary
to govern “themselves.” Hicks  was rather explicit in this regard
when it held that the second exception was inapplicable.  The
majority ruled that “[s]elf -government and internal  relations are
not directly at issue here, since the issue is whether the Tribes’
law will apply, not to their own members, but to a narrow cate-
gory of outsiders.”262
A shared premise in Worcester  and the modern cases is the
259 Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 383 (2001) (Souter, J., concurring).  While it is
beyond the scope of this article, it would be interesting to compare the recent devel-
opments in tribal court jurisdiction over nonmembers with the personal jurisdiction
developments in state courts.  A nonresident can be forced to defend a lawsuit in a
distant state forum so long as the state’s long arm statute authorizes personal juris-
diction and the exercise of such jurisdiction satisfies the minimum contacts and fair-
ness requirements under the Due Process Clause. See  Burger King Corp. v.
Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462 (1985); World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444
U.S. 286 (1980); Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).  Moreover, the
forum state could choose to apply its own law to resolve the dispute. See  Allstate
Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302 (1981).  Thus, a New Yorker who negligently drives a
car in Hawaii and causes an accident could be forced to defend himself in Hawaii.
The New Yorker would be subject to Hawaii law despite the fact that the structure
of the courts, the independence of the judiciary, and the substantive law may be
different from New York.  Additionally, the New Yorker has no input into the selec-
tion of those judges or the content of the substantive and procedural rules governing
the outcome of his case.  The nonresident defendant might have an opportunity to
remove the case to federal court, depending on the amount in controversy. See  28
U.S.C. § 1441 (1994).  And the state courts, unlike the tribal courts, are ultimately
bound by the U.S. Constitution. See  Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376 (1896).  Never-
theless there are many practical considerations that are similar in considering the
reach of tribal court jurisdiction and the extent of state court power. See  Resnick,
supra  note 9 (urging expansion of federal court jurisprudence to include considera-
tion of tribal courts).
260 Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 566 (1981).
261 Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438, 459 (1997).
262 Hicks , 533 U.S. at 371.
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notion of Indian peoples as the “other.”  In some respects, tribal
sovereignty issues are easy to resolve when Indians are viewed in
this manner.  As a general matter, “they” can exercise some de-
gree of sovereignty only over “themselves.”263  The challenge for
contemporary tribal sovereignty problems, however, is found in
instances when Indians do not behave as the other.
Chief Justice Marshall may have viewed Indians as a “people
with whom it was impossible to mix. . . .”264  But his assessment,
whether or not accurate at the time, is no longer so.  Consider,
for example, the area of economic development by Indian tribes.
Recently, many tribes have engaged in a wide range of economic
activities similar to those of the general public and involving sub-
stantial interaction with non-Indians.  For example, the Missis-
sippi Band of Choctow Indians operates a number of businesses,
including manufacturing of auto parts and production of greeting
cards.265  The Gila River Indian Community has an industrial
complex, a health care corporation, and a telecommunication
company.266  The White Mountain Apache Tribes operate a ski
resort.267  The Fort McDowell Yavapai Nation runs a gas station,
a resort ranch, a concrete company, and a pecan farm.268  The
Cabazon Band of Mission Indians has bowling alleys, an export
assistance center, and a printing and graphic design company.269
The Seminole Tribe operates an aircraft company, an online
shopping plaza, a broadcasting firm, a tour company, and an
inn.270  The Mashantucket Pequot Tribal Nation has the most
profitable casino in the country.271  The Keweenaw Bay Band In-
263 The Court, of course, does not usually view sovereignty in such limited terms.
It allows states, for example, to exercise sovereign powers over citizens of other
states. See supra  note 259.
264 Johnson v. McIntosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 590 (1823).
265 Overview of Tribal Business , at  http://www.choctaw.org/show.asp?durki=35
(last visited July 20, 2003).
266 Business Entities , at  http://www.gric.nsn.us (last visited July 20, 2003).
267 Tribal Enterprises , at  http://www.wmat.us/enterprises.shtml (last visited July
20, 2003).
268 Fort McDowell Yavapai Nation: Enterprises , at  http://www.ftmcdowell.org/ en-
terprises.htm (last visited July 20, 2003).
269 Enterprises , at  http://www.cabazonnation.com/cgi-bin/ducs/display.pl?o=con-
tent_cms&i=4 (last visited July 20, 2003).
270 Tourism/Enterprises: What We Do , at  http://www.seminoletribe.com/enter-
prises (last visited July 20, 2003).
271 See  Naomi Mezey, Note: The Distribution of Wealth, Sovereignty, and Culture
Through Indian Gaming , 48 STAN. L. REV. 711, 725 (1996) (describing the profits of
Foxwoods Casino, which had gross profits that were twice as much as any casino in
Atlantic City or Las Vegas).
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dian Community has a bath products manufacturing company, a
fence company, mini-marts, and a radio station.272  The Chicka-
saw Nation operates a chocolate company, a utility authority, and
a lodge and restaurant.273  The Oneida Indian Nation of New
York runs a casino, a hotel, golf courses, smoke shops, and a tex-
tile company.274  The Rosebud Sioux Indian Tribe has a wide
range of businesses, including construction, dam building, land-
scaping, janitorial services, retail office equipment, electronics as-
sembly, and roofing companies, as well as an engineering and
surveying firm, and a wood products industry.275  Finally, a num-
ber of tribes are involved in businesses related to the natural re-
sources found on Indian country.276  These are only a few
examples of the kinds of tribal-run businesses currently in
operation.
Such developments do not fit within an understanding of the
Indian as “the other,” and with Chief Justice Marshall’s assess-
ment that Indians will not “mix.”  There may be a temptation to
conclude that tribes should lose their unique sovereignty when
they behave like members of the dominant community.277  Cer-
tainly, such sentiment exists among some members of the general
public.  In certain areas of the country, there has been intense
opposition to tribal efforts to participate in economic develop-
ment activities.  The Mississippi Choctaws, for example, pro-
voked an “uproar” when they purchased a car dealership in
Carthage, Mississippi.278  Other dealers complained even though
the Nation agreed to pay all sales and property taxes.279  These
dealers apparently worried that the tribe could break its
272 Tribal Owned Enterprises , at  http://www.ojibwa.com/tribal_biz.htm (last up-
dated Feb. 2003).
273 Business , at  http://www.chickasaw.net/alivecity/servlet/NavForward?sid=97&
appactive=yes&req=MHomePage_cn5 (last visited July 20, 2003).
274 Economic Enterprises , at  http://oneida-nation.net/erprises.html (last visited
July 20, 2003).
275 See Rosebud Sioux Tribe:  Community Environmental Profile , at  http://www.
minisose.org/profiles/rosebud.html (last visited Sept. 5, 2003).
276 See PAULA MITCHELL MARKS, IN A BARREN LAND 371-74 (1998).
277 Barbara Atwood observed that “while most Indian tribes historically have re-
sisted assimilation and struggled to retain a distinctive cultural and political identity,
their growing power today had highlighted the anomaly of recognizing unique rights
for tribal members in a larger society formally committed to equality.”  Atwood,
supra note 11, at 939.
278 Danny Hakim, Off the Reservation, Onto the Dealer’s Lot , N.Y. TIMES, May
14, 2002, at C1.
279 Id.
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promises and have an unfair competitive advantage.280  Similarly,
a New York group called the Upstate Citizens for Equality com-
plained bitterly about the sovereign status of the Cayuga Indian
Nation, stating that the Nation would have unfair business ad-
vantages and concluding that “[t]he establishment of a self-pro-
claimed sovereign nation  within the counties and state threaten
[sic] the very fabric of communities and the freedoms the United
States is founded on.”281  In a very frightening example of oppo-
sition, a group calling itself the United States National Freedom
Fighters announced that it would begin “blood shedding,” shoot-
ing individuals who contribute to the Oneida Indian Nation of
New York by supporting the casino or purchasing gas at the tri-
bal-owned gas station.282
Notwithstanding such attacks, a strong case can be made that
tribal sovereign powers are necessary, especially when tribes be-
come involved in economic development.  Stephen Cornell and
Joseph Kalt have found in their studies that political sover-
eignty—“the extent to which a tribe has genuine control over
reservation decision-making, the use of reservation resources,
and relations with the outside world”283—is one of the key ele-
ments of successful tribal economic development.  Their research
at the Udall Center and the Harvard Project on American Indian
Economic Development underscores the proposition that tribal
control over tribal affairs is a necessary component of any suc-
cessfully planned economic development by an Indian tribe.
They concluded:  “We have been unable to find a single reserva-
tion where major decisions are controlled by outsiders—the
states, the federal government, or special interests—where suc-
cessful economic development has taken root.”284  Cornell ex-
plained that tribal sovereignty is critical for economic
development in three respects:  (1) it ensures accountability; (2)
280 Id.
281 Upstate Citizens for Equality, Inc., Sovereignty , at  http://www.uceland
claim.com/sovereignty.htm (last visited July 20, 2003).
282 Assault on the Oneida , at  http://www.dickshovel.com/oneida2.html (last visited
July 20, 2003).
283 STEPHEN CORNELL & JOSEPH P. KALT, HARVARD UNIV., RELOADING THE
DICE:  IMPROVING THE CHANCES FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT ON AMERICAN IN-
DIAN RESERVATIONS 6 (1992), available at  http://www.ksg.harvard.edu/hpaied/ docs/
PRS92-1.pdf.
284 STEPHEN CORNELL & JONATHAN TAYLOR, UNIV. OF ARIZ., SOVEREIGNTY,
DEVOLUTION, AND THE FUTURE OF TRIBAL-STATE RELATIONS 4 (2000), available at
http://udallcenter.arizona.edu/publications/pdf/tribal%20state%20relations.pdf.
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it offers opportunities such as reduced taxes and exemptions
from some regulatory burdens; and (3) it ensures control over
the tribe’s resources and affairs.285
Tribal sovereignty not only serves as a catalyst for economic
development but is also enhanced by that development.  Success-
ful economic initiatives provide tribal governments with the reve-
nue necessary to perform a wide range of functions, including
police, educational, housing, legal, and medical services for tribal
members.  This revenue is desperately needed.  As one commen-
tator recently reported, “American Indians suffer from the high-
est rates of poverty, unemployment and substandard housing of
any group in the United States.”286  Economic activities provide
tribes with an opportunity to escape from these impoverished
conditions.  Ray Halbritter, Nation Representative for the
Oneida Indian Nation of New York, described that Nation’s com-
prehensive uses of the new resources generated from its eco-
nomic activities as follows:
[T]he results of our actions have empowered us greatly.  Our
decision to establish gaming has allowed us to reacquire more
than 2,600 acres of our ancient land for our people, the first
lands ever reacquired in any manner by any of the Haude-
nosaunee nations.  We feed our elders and are able now to
conduct our ceremonies on a regular basis.  The first building
we built with our profits as a nation was a council house, which
is our spiritual and governmental meeting place.  We have
since then built a cook house, a health services center, a cul-
tural center and museum, a recreational center, a swimming
pool, a bath house, a children’s playground, a gymnasium, and
a lacrosse box.  Using our own money we also have estab-
lished scholarship programs, medical, dental, and optical ser-
vices, job training and legal assistance programs, Oneida
language and song classes, mental health and substance abuse
programs, elder meals programs, and other beneficial services
for our people.  We have established a police force, paved our
roads, built a septic system, consecrated a burial ground,
opened a youth center, and built housing for our people, and
with the opening of the casino have become one of the major
economic powers in Central New York State and one of the
largest employers in the Central New York region.287
285 Stephen Cornell, Sovereignty, Prosperity, and Policy in Indian Country Today ,
at  http://www.kc.frb.org/publicat/commrein/u97pers2.htm (last visited July 20, 2003)
(quoted in GETCHES, supra  note 60, at 722).
286 Robert J. Miller, Economic Development in Indian County:  Will Capitalism or
Socialism Succeed? , 80 OR. L. REV. 757, 758-59 (2001).
287 Ray Halbritter & Steven Paul McSloy, Empowerment or Dependence?  The
Practical Value and Meaning of Native American Sovereignty , 26 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L.
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As Halbritter succinctly stated:  “We had tried poverty for 200
years, so we decided to try something else.”288
Not all tribes, of course, are engaged in such economic activi-
ties.  Within and among tribes, serious issues are arising regard-
ing the appropriateness of these activities.289  In his description
of the Oneida’s economic development, Halbritter noted that
“[t]he big issue for the Oneida as a people was, of course,
whether selling cigarettes or gaming was an ‘Indian’ thing to do.
Was it a sell-out, a sacrifice of what we believed as traditional
Houdenosaunee people?”290  He concluded that the economic
independence empowered the Oneida Indian Nation of New
York, enabled it to reacquire ancestor land, renewed self-esteem
among the members, and allowed the Nation to preserve its cul-
tural heritage.291
CONCLUSION
It might be suggested that under the Montana  exceptions
tribes have sufficient inherent sovereignty to address issues aris-
ing from business activities.  The first exception applies specifi-
cally to activities of nonmembers who enter consensual
commercial relationships with tribes.  As Strate  illustrates, how-
ever, this exception does not reach nonmembers who enter In-
dian country, even for commercial business purposes, when the
dispute does not involve the tribe directly.292  Moreover, Strate
demonstrates that the Court reads very narrowly the second ex-
ception, concerning conduct that threatens the political integrity,
economic security, or welfare of the tribe, to apply only where
the tribal interest relates directly to self-government.293  Thus,
the Montana  exceptions support inherent tribal sovereignty only
in the most limited circumstances.
& POL. 531, 568-69 (1994).  Tribal economic development also benefits state and
federal governments by improving local economies. See , e.g. , id.  at 569; Miller,
supra  note 286, at 848.
288 Halbritter & McSloy, supra  note 287, at 568.
289 See  Mezey, supra  note 271.
290 Halbritter & McSloy, supra  note 287, at 566.
291 Id.  at 571-72.  Other tribes might reach different conclusions about the appro-
priateness of economic development.  To be sure, such decisions are for the tribes
themselves, and I am not arguing that tribes should undertake these kinds of eco-
nomic activities.
292 See supra  text accompanying note 128.
293 In Strate , the Court described this exception as authorizing tribes to determine
tribal membership, punish tribal members, regulate domestic relations, and pre-
scribe rules of inheritance.  Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438, 459 (1997).
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It also might be suggested that as a practical matter Congress
could remedy some of the specific sovereignty problems created
by the Montana  line of cases.  As it did with respect to Duro ,294
Congress could overrule these recent cases by enacting legisla-
tion that recognizes295 tribal regulatory and adjudicative powers
over nonmembers who engage in activities on Indian country.
The cases discussed in this essay involve the Court’s own articula-
tion of inherent tribal powers and concede that Congress could
recognize an expanded version of tribal sovereignty.296  Con-
gress, however, may have difficulty overruling the specific hold-
ing of Hicks  that a tribal court lacks power to entertain an action
for damages against state officers.  Congress derives its power
over Indian affairs from Article I, and the Court has refused to
find that Article I grants Congress power to abrogate a state’s
immunity from suit in federal court,297 in state court,298 or before
a federal agency.299  Even recognizing Congress’s plenary power
over Indian affairs, the Court is unlikely to find congressional
support for an abrogation of state sovereign immunity in tribal
courts. Congress presumably could authorize a tribal court to
award damages against state officers in their personal capaci-
ties.300  But, whether there is political support for any kind of
legislative solution is, of course, a separate matter.  Moreover, as
Philip Frickey warned, “Colonialism is a dangerous political
game, and congressional considerations of these problems could
go in a variety of directions, some of them devastating to
tribes.”301
More important, these suggestions miss the larger point.  It is
no exaggeration to conclude that the Court’s repudiation of in-
294 Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676 (1990); see supra  note 98.
295 I intentionally use the word “recognizes,” rather than “authorizes,” as a way to
respond to the challenge that we should not simply accept as a given Congress’s
plenary power. See  Porter, supra  note 35.
296 See , e.g. , Strate , 520 U.S. at 446 (providing:  “Montana  thus described a gen-
eral rule that, absent a different congressional direction , Indian tribes lack civil au-
thority over the conduct of nonmembers on non-Indian land, subject to two
exceptions.”) (emphasis added). See also  United States v. Enas, 255 F.3d 662, 670
(9th Cir. 2001), cert. denied , 534 U.S. 1115 (2002) (upholding congressional power to
recognize tribal criminal jurisdiction over nonmembers).
297 See  Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
298 See  Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999).
299 See  Fed. Mar. Comm’n v. South Carolina State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743
(2002).
300 See supra  text accompanying notes 179-80.
301 Frickey, Common Law , supra  note 7, at 85.
\\server05\productn\O\ORE\82-1\ORE103.txt unknown Seq: 41 11-NOV-03 9:13
Tribal Sovereignty:  Them and Us 115
herent tribal sovereignty has created one of the most significant
threats to tribes since the allotment period.302  By suggesting that
tribal power extends only to members and not to territory, the
Court is “leaving tribes with no more governmental power than a
club or a union or a church may exercise over its members.”303
Moreover, in separating sovereignty from land the Court disre-
gards the centrality of land to Indian culture.  As Paula Mitchell
Marks observed:
Whatever growth and changes do occur, it is primarily the land
itself—the fragile, divided land—that supports and sustains In-
dian identity and culture.  “Who we are is our land, our trees,
and our lakes,” says Winona LaDuke.  Such pronouncements
may occasionally sound like self-serving romanticism, but they
are an expression of centuries of Indian reality.304
As described, the Court has created this threat to tribal sover-
eignty by continuing to rely on implicit assumptions about Indian
identity, on whether Indians are behaving like dominant groups
or as distinctive groups.  It is not simply a problem that arises out
of increased contact between Indians and non-Indians.  Rather, it
is a more fundamental one of viewing Indians as either “them”
or “us” in resolving sovereignty disputes.  This kind of either/or
conception ignores the possibility that Indians could chose to be
both; they could chose to maintain their distinctiveness and en-
gage in modern day activities.305  Filmmaker Zacharias Kunuk
captured this idea quite vividly when he said:
302 John St. Clair, Chief Judge of the Shoshone and Arapahoe Tribal Court,
warned that the recent trend in the Supreme Court “poses the greatest threat to
tribes since the allotment era of the 19th century and congressional termination of
the mid-20th century. . . .” Rulings of the U.S. Supreme Court as They Affect the
Powers and Authorities of the Indian Tribal Governments:  Hearing Before the Senate
Comm. on Indian Affairs , 107th Cong. 29 (2002) (testimony of John St. Clair, Chief
Judge of the Shoshone and Arapahoe Tribal Court) (cited in FEDERAL BAR ASSOCI-
ATION, 27TH ANNUAL INDIAN LAW CONFERENCE:  REAFFIRMING TRIBAL SOVER-
EIGNTY IN AN ERA OF JUDICIAL ACTIVISM:  COURSE MATERIALS 200 (2002)). See
also  Royster, supra  note 7.
303 Rulings of the U.S. Supreme Court as They Affect the Powers and Authorities of
the Indian Tribal Governments:  Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on Indian Affairs ,
107th Cong. 48 (2002) (prepared statement of  Hon. William Canby, Jr., Senior
Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit) (cited in FEDERAL
BAR ASSOCIATION, supra  note 302, at 176).
304 MARKS, supra  note 276, at 375.
305 In the first edition of her book, Patricia Hill Collins described the more gen-
eral use of “either/or dichotomous thinking” to maintain oppression. PATRICIA
HILL COLLINS, BLACK FEMINIST THOUGHT:  KNOWLEDGE, CONSCIOUSNESS, AND
THE POLITICS OF EMPOWERMENT 28-29, 225-27 (1st ed. 1990).
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If it were up to me, I would go back to the law of the Inuit, the
law of nature.  I would live like that while checking e-mail in
the morning, calling halfway around the world to do business,
watching wars in my living room on television.  It is possible to
do both in this day.306
Whether it is desirable to do both is a matter for tribes to re-
solve for themselves.307  Some tribes may well conclude, for ex-
ample, that economic development or similar assimilative
activities pose threats to their cultural identity and sovereignty.
Other tribes might decide that economic self-sufficiency is neces-
sary to maintain their independence and cultural heritage.  It is
not my purpose in this Article to suggest that one of these ap-
proaches is more appropriate than the other.  Indeed, it should
not be surprising that tribes will select different approaches to
such issues given the pluralism among Indian peoples. In this re-
gard, it must be remembered that “Native America comprises
hundreds of politically distinct, separately recognized communi-
ties, as well as a large intertribal urban population with many
unique social and cultural institutions and practices and its own
set of political issues and interests.”308
Rather, my point is that the Court appears to be resolving tri-
bal sovereignty issues based on preconceived assumptions about
Indian identity.  Carole Goldberg concluded in a somewhat dif-
ferent context, that courts deem Indians deserving of special con-
sideration “only when they are acting in conformity with non-
Indian conceptions of their culture, which typically requires that
they ‘must remain unchanged in order to be considered “In-
dian.”’”309  Similarly, Joane Nagel described the view that “Na-
tive Americans are somehow not really Indians unless they are
living according to some putative nineteenth-century lifestyle.”310
This appears to be the Court’s unarticulated assumption in
306 Clifford Krauss, Returning Tundra’s Rhythm to the Inuit, in Film , N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 30, 2002, at A4.
307 See  Porter, supra  note 35, at 111-12.
308 JOANE NAGEL, AMERICAN INDIAN ETHNIC RENEWAL 7 (1996). See also
Porter, supra  note 35, at 101 (“There are within the United States, over six hundred
recognized and unrecognized Indigenous sovereigns . . . . By virtue of population,
culture, geography, and the nuances of history, no two Indigenous peoples are the
same.”).
309 Carole Goldberg, Descent Into Race , 49 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1373, 1379 (2002)
(quoting Jack D. Forbes, The Manipulation of Race, Caste, and Identity:  Classifying
Afroamericans, Native-Americans, and Red-Black People , 17 J. ETHNIC STUD. at 23
(1990)).
310 NAGEL, supra  note 308, at 71 (cited in Goldberg, supra  note 309, at 1380).
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resolving sovereignty disputes, recognizing inherent tribal sover-
eignty only when viewed as necessary to enable Indian peoples to
behave in some distinctive fashion.  On the other hand, the Court
is reluctant to recognize sovereignty when tribes act like groups
in the general population.
Is there a resolution of the problem?  The Court, of course,
could abandon its self-imposed, restricted view of tribal sover-
eignty.  Specifically, when given the next opportunity it could
read Hicks  narrowly as applying only when state officials are
sued in tribal court.  It could hold as a general proposition that
tribes have adjudicative and regulatory power over their mem-
bers as well as nonmembers who enter tribal or trust-held lands.
This outcome, however, is unlikely.311  The slide down the sover-
eignty slope has gained momentum since Montana .  A reversal of
the current tribal sovereignty trend would require the Court to
conceive of Indians, not as either them or us, but as peoples who
might choose to be both and for whom tribal sovereignty is es-
sential to their cultural and political survival.
311 See , e.g. , Getches, supra  note 7, at 361; Porter, supra  note 35, at 110-11; Roy-
ster, supra note 7, at 76.
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